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Abstract: Based on the Critical Theory of Society by the philosopher Theodor Adorno, this study proposes to 
reflect on objective elements of the context of institutional and social structure that founded ideas regarding 
rationality and domination, considering subjective factors correlated to the sociologist Max Weber’s ideas. In this 
sense, ideas about the complex formation of the subject’s identity against the demands of human conservation, 
presented in the light of Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalysis, are corroborated; A discussion, although controversial, 
fundamental to critical theory, since it considers contributions of psychology permeated by elements that expand 
beyond determined, conscious or alienated behaviors. That is, it aims at cultural, historical and sociological factors 
as primordial bases for analysis of ideology as a rational factor which runs through the modern period.
Keywords: formation, identity, violence, authority, politics.
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Theodor Adorno’s critical theory of society results 
from studies and research recognized by the Frankfurt 
School (Jay, 1974). This School stands out because of 
its wide, multivocal perspective, which, in Adorno’s 
understanding, attempts to dialectically reflect on the 
relationship between individual and society, in order to 
“once again refer to this multivocal concept of object as 
the no less multivocal concept of subject” (1969/1995, 
p. 184). Nevertheless, this perspective considers all areas 
of the theory of knowledge to be essential, although 
criticized, as notes the Marxist historian Martin Jay 
(1974), for whom the Frankfurter group:
Encompassed so many diverse fields that a 
definitive analysis of each of these would require 
a team of scholars that were experts in everything, 
from musicology to sinology . . .; in the thought 
of the Frankfurt School, there was an essential 
coherence that affected all work in different areas. 
(pp. 15-16)
This multivocal perspective, compared to the 
binomial of subject and object, favors radical criticism 
towards the rational processes that mediate social 
dehumanization in cultural and socio-historical terms. 
In order to investigate this problematic in the approach 
described, authors are suggested to face the contradictions 
of a rational framework in constant interface with 
sociological, historical, philosophical and psychological 
factors of the object, these factors being permeated by the 
complex connection between society and individual. This 
justifies Adorno’s careful attention in several of his works 
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to the theory of knowledge that was created since the 
classical Greek age, considering authors such as Plato and 
Aristotle, those whose contribution laid the foundations 
for modern thought, such as Kant, Hegel, Marx, Weber 
and Freud, among many others (Jay, 1974). Because of 
the broad nuance and its connections within the theory 
of knowledge itself, it would be impossible to present all 
of these contributions at once due to their complexity.
This draws attention to a principle that governs the 
work of the Frankfurt School, and Adorno in particular, 
namely, a certain caution as to the course of modern 
civilization, which consolidates a technical rationality 
in a contradictory perspective, in that it maintains social 
domination at a material and human level. This scenario 
and its dehumanizing potential are questioned in the 
face of a possible resistance in an emancipatory sense 
(Adorno, 1971/1995; Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944/1988). 
This reflection allows us to confront, within our own 
theory of knowledge, elements of rationality that retake 
the relation between subject and object, individual 
and society. Given that it justifies the delimitation of 
interlocution by Adorno with two important authors: 
Weber (1864-1920) and Freud (1856-1939).
In a detailed look at Max Weber’s (1920/1995) 
work Politics as a vocation, a critique of the process 
of rationality that precedes the analysis of the political 
universe can be seen, a critique constituting Adorno’s 
theoretical perspective on Weber’s legacy. Adorno 
(1920/1995) reiterates, in Weber’s thought, elements 
that link the recognition of institutional domination 
mechanisms and the human (conscious) rational potential 
for refusal and resistance against the oppressive system.
In the light of Adorno (1969/1995), while Max 
Weber allows society to discern reality as it is presented 
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through rational mastery administered by control over 
others, Sigmund Freud’s broad thinking in psychoanalysis 
contributes to cultural formation in the sense of presenting 
subjective subsidies (in individual and collective 
terms) as a basis for reflection on the contradictions of 
cultural mediations that themselves consolidate social 
rationality, whose materiality grounds institutions based 
on legitimized symbolic values  (Adorno, 1955/1960, 
1969/1995).
For Freud (1917/2010), a theory of the individual 
based on the relationship between rationality (conscious 
intention) and the non-rational (unconscious) psychic 
foundation, in a contradictory manner, seeks to understand 
the ascendancy of the unconsciousness (repressed, hidden 
reality) over consciousness (elaborated, recognized 
reality). These studies apprehend the human object 
in its interface with socialization and its conflicting 
relationship between pleasure and displeasure which, 
according to Freud (1929/1973), conceives social relations, 
while at the same time originating from primary needs 
and the creation of desires, resulting in the elaboration of 
primary instincts that constitute sublimation (instinctual 
elaboration of investment and renunciation to immediate 
pleasure because of social acceptance). This process 
involves the relation between activity, elaboration, cultural 
production, and the individual and collective social 
acceptance of the subject. The instinctual/driving factor 
(based on social formation) that comes from libidinal 
energy is vital for identification processes, constituted “by 
and for” objective reality, referring to the development of 
singular character (as to what pertains to human identity) 
as well as groups and institutions.
Although Freud and Weber differentiate 
themselves by different theoretical grounds – each with 
due proportions –, their studies on social mediation 
contribute to analyze the power relations that converge 
towards the exercise of social domination in different 
instances; they enable reflection on the contradictions of 
the idea of  authority and its nexuses that hinder human 
emancipation due to properly administered social 
organization in the human and social spheres.
This process relies on a barbaric and inhuman 
rational organization that slips into political and 
cultural actions. In the sequence, especially with regard 
to the statute of reason, it is possible to observe that, 
in Max Weber’s sociological theory (1920/1995), the 
understanding of different aspects of political rationality is 
defined, allowing for a subjective and objective conception 
of human action by means of the concept of social action. 
For Weber (1920/2002), this concept is Sociology’s object 
of study. Social action presents a sense that is subjectively 
directed towards the other, with whom there is agreement 
in significant elements of social objectivity.
Weber (2004), in his Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, briefly states that the Protestant 
ethos, originated from Calvinist puritanism in the specific 
currents and sects of the Quakers, Methodists, Baptists, 
and Anabaptists, establishes a connection of meaning 
to its ethos, called the “spirit” of capitalism. In Weber 
(1920/2002), the connection and motivation of senses 
is what clarifies his sociological theory. It is about 
understanding how the meanings of social action connect 
to each other based on elective affinities. This means 
that a plan to build social projects such as capitalism, 
for instance, would not be at the origin of social actions. 
In this sense, among many social results, capitalism is 
one of the many meanings that have connected to allow 
for its existence.
Thus, to Weber, the motives that lead to relations 
of domination are material and rational; however, not 
all domination immediately serves economic means, 
let alone economic ends (Weber, 1920/1995). There are 
thus subjective elements that originate from the history 
of each individual (such as authority or submission) that 
also define these relations of power, a fact that refers 
to the reflection about the place of subjectivity as a 
resistance component against the pragmatic rationality 
of domination.
Based on Adorno (1969/1995), this discussion 
turns to a formative and cultural perspective based 
on the classical contradiction between universal and 
particular, idealism and materialism, subject and object. A 
dialectical elaboration that seeks to denounce the inhuman 
instrumentalization of reason that surpasses the critical 
conscience from ideological domination mechanisms, 
in cultural and institutional levels, ways of producing 
and thinking individual and collective life. To study the 
relations of power and authority that maintain legitimizing 
processes of political dynamics through the administration 
of instrumental rationality means to access consciousness, 
according to Adorno (1971/1995), and makes it emerge 
as human emancipation.
For Adorno (1971/1995), emancipation, in 
a broad sense, refers to the ability of the subject to 
conduct formative experiences as well as to the “self-
reflection from which the individual consciousness can 
liberate itself and expand” (p. 47); he presupposes the 
freedom and overcoming of individualism to execute 
experiences opposed to actions based on the immediacy 
and superficiality of its contents, contrary to cultural 
formation (bildung) and critical, self-critical and 
creative spirit.
Although emancipation is characterized by 
the formation of subjects’ autonomy, in a Kantian 
philosophical sense, Adorno (1969/1995) considers that 
socio-historical context and its formative process leads 
thought to the comprehension of reality in its tension 
between totality and particularity through recognition 
of the contradictions of enlightenment, its discrepancies 
and, above all, the author pursues critical and dialectical 
formation in the fight against technicist and unifying 
thought, crystallized in inhuman and barbaric situations. 
In this case, history is important for the Frankfurtian 
critical theory as far as the enlightenment program is 
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concerned, as well as the reversal of this ideology’s 
meaning, based on instrumental, adaptive and uncritical 
rationality, being resistant to the constitution of subject 
authors of real praxis, individual and collective terms 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1988).
Rationality and society: objective and 
subjective domination 
To think of rationality and its contradictions in 
material and human terms, from an Adornian perspective, 
a priori, demands the confrontation of the duality of 
subjectivity and objectivity (Adorno, 1969/1995). The 
relation between subject and object that is established by 
an objectified – or alienated – mediation is considered 
propositive for the technical and scientific advances 
of social, political and economic development. The 
socio-historical structure is a fundamental element to 
understand ideological reality, which seeks to pervert 
identities from an idealized rationality, produced by a 
series of cultural effects and actions, by means of thinking 
and acting.
According to Adorno (1955/1960), in studying 
the subjective elements of culture in order to demystify 
the vision of a fully rational man, Freud also contributed 
to the understanding of an administrated rationality 
in which the struggle between desire, satisfaction and 
necessity prevails as a condition for sociability. On the 
other hand, in Weber (1920/1995), social administration 
reveals imperatives of a political rationality oriented by 
means-ends, which presupposes its own preservation as a 
price for survival. This converges with Freudian thought 
in that it posits a dilemma involving the relationship 
between survival, work, and conditions for overcoming 
man’s primary nature, while considering autonomy 
and the struggle against individual, cultural and social 
dehumanization.
Thus, including that which the culture of liberal 
domination, appearance and profit rejected as a formative 
perspective (due to the contradictions of consciousness), 
to become itself resistance to its emancipatory meaning, 
the identification with mechanisms of the development of 
social life and its alienation turns to lucrative interests – a 
measure of the ideological character of labor approved by 
human submission. Confused by its ideological logico-
formal contradiction (a pragmatic and immediatist, 
antireflexive rationality), this characterization of labor 
became a pillar of permanently concealed domination, 
converted to power issues and objectified in the 
instrumentalization of reason (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1944/1988).
Because of this rationality, considering the 
historical dynamics permeated by diverse political 
intentions, labor appears ideologically allied to ethics 
as a vocation (Weber, 1920/1995). This contributes to 
the primacy of economy as a function of surplus value 
in effective production decisions, since, for Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1944/1988), in this new reality prevails 
a difficulty to judge the real and the false aspect of 
needs, given the complex universe of capital. A dialectic 
relationship between the specificities of labor in capitalist 
society and the constitution of an instrumental rationality 
that emerges from alienated social relations of production 
is postulated. Rationality institutionally reorganizes 
what emancipation cannot reach – which refers to 
the Freudian elaboration of what happens in society, 
“something common, an interest shared in an object, 
a similar affective orientation in a given situation . . . a 
certain level in ability to influence each other” (Freud, 
1920/2011, p. 34).
Thus, it is worth noting that personal ties influence 
individuals while causing changes and limitations, since 
identification with social and political norms promotes 
conduct standards in collective relations and their 
organization. The control exerted by institutions suggests 
the retraction of the work of thinking and reflecting, which 
is compensated by physical action, contributing to hinder 
freedom and autonomy, a standardized, instrumental and 
institutionally rationality legitimized by an idea that is based 
on power and domination, ultimately seeking only profit.
Since the identity of individuals is constructed 
upon social relations, renouncing their immediate and 
instinctual needs for the social good, resistance to existing 
coercive forces in the name of the integration of the 
subjects becomes a sacrifice by means of fear of exclusion 
(Freud, 1929/1973). This imposes renunciations, rational 
elaborations (formative/cultural), individual and social 
constraints.
Thus, Weber (1920/1995) is prepared to reflect 
on the meaning of social organization and its actions 
that are manifested by a rationality instrumented by the 
institutional domain in a subjective and objective scope, 
in which political administration predominates, being 
legitimized by actors who repeat themselves historically: 
However, even among the older political formations, 
the personal domination of the boss is widespread” 
(Weber, 1920/1995, p. 61). Thus, it is possible to show 
how social life is organized based on the capitalist logic of 
management, which, in defense of property (satisfaction 
of immediate needs), enslaves everyone: those who hold 
the power of production assets and their profit and those 
who, submissively, carry out productive work, promoting 
the intensification of individualism and instrumental 
reason. In general terms,
Power means any likelihood of imposing one’s will 
on a social relationship. Even against resistance, 
whatever the basis of that likelihood may be. 
Domination is the likelihood to find obedience to 
an order of certain content among certain indicative 
people; discipline is the likelihood to find prompt, 
automatic, and schematic obedience to an order 
among an indicative plurality of person by virtue of 
trained activities. (Weber, 1920/1995, p. 33)
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Power, necessity and domination interact 
effectively with completely diverse laws mediated 
“essentially by political administration” (Weber, 1991, 
p. 63). This leads to interference in the formation of 
identity for a critical reasoning of individuals, since they 
should consider the social representations attributed 
to them, which would enable social participation and 
investment in critical reflection.
Weber (1995/2004), when presenting the human 
condition as being administered in nature, the individual 
as a social agent in the service of pragmatic rationality 
allows to counteract the false condition of the ideal subject 
in the context and conditions of insertion in culture, and 
thus acquisition of critical knowledge becomes resistance 
to social adaptation. It is important to remember that 
for Weber (1920/1995), even among the older political 
formations, “the personal power of the chief is an element 
of identification for domination types” (p. 61). This refers 
to the Freudian reflection on the social role of the leader 
in the constitution of identity through identifications.
Adherence to a leader or institution is not 
abstracted from the relationships that are given by 
appearance, it is based on identifications. According to 
Freud (1920/2011), in psychoanalysis, identification is: 
“The oldest manifestation of a bond/affective attachment 
to another person. It plays a specific role in the prehistory 
of the Oedipus complex” (Freud, 1920/2011, p. 60). Thus, 
identification between people conceives social and 
institutional structures. We can broaden this analysis 
to the political universe by considering the dominating 
role of the State appreciated by Weber.
For Weber (1920/1995), in the midst of the world 
of politics, the “State [is constituted] in relation to the 
domination of man over man, grounded on the instrument 
of legitimate violence” (p. 57). Human submission 
legitimizes domination by adherence (or identification). 
Does this make the author question the conditions 
under which humans submit themselves, and why? 
Weber explains the basis of legitimacy by considering 
three elements of power: traditional, charismatic, and 
by competence (p 57). These kinds of power reveal a 
need for social obedience. They are dictated by “fear 
or hope”, in the “strength” of adherence for survival, 
according to the material and affective conditions of 
each one. Thus, the discussion leads to an interlocution 
with Freudian explanations about identification with 
power for survival and materialization of domination in 
collectivity. In general terms, a set of efforts is invested 
in order to participate in power at different fronts 
(domineering and dominated) and, therefore, the political 
authority conferred by representation or identification, 
more specifically, its own varied needs, anchored in the 
structural context, is consolidated.
For Freud (1914/2010), since the object (other) 
stands in the place of the narcissistic ego (ideal ego), 
we have an undifferentiated subject, which reveals self-
preservation based on the relationship between guilt and 
duty. This conflict denotes that “The individual does 
actually carry a double existence, as an end in itself and 
as the link of a chain, in which it serves against, or at any 
rate without any volition of his own” (Freud, 1914/2010, 
p. 20). This process is not of conscience and refers to the 
price that the individual pays to be socially accepted. This 
reality assigns the institutional role played by authorities 
and the submissive subject.
Thus, since it corresponds to the appeasement 
of the proposal of equality under the domain of the 
object (an idea or a leader), the subject who adapts by 
coercive means to the criteria of socially instituted 
mechanisms without reflection perpetuates the reified 
rationality, and therefore, to deny this sacrifice to endorse 
self-conservative rationality is the same as to become 
self-sacrifice: “What remains identical and emerges 
with the overcoming of sacrifice is once again a hard, 
petrified sacrificial ritual, which man celebrates for 
himself by opposing his consciousness to the context of 
nature” (Adorno & Horkheimer, 1956/1977, p. 60). The 
psychoanalytic axiom of the price of progress reappears, 
instituted by the repression of primary needs in the 
acquisition of socialization between man, culture and 
society (Freud, 1929/1973).
Such a dose of sacrifice, a priori is required for 
the formation of the self, its socialization and possible 
emancipation. Precisely for this reason, critical reflection 
on social reality is necessary to allow for the constitution 
of a critical identity. A fundamental element in this process 
is labor, whose dynamic is determined by the division 
between ruptures and dependencies in the relations 
between subjects. The dependency nexus configures 
something in which:
Bonds become social passports – accepted by a 
person for the purpose of legitimizing themselves 
as an honorable citizen – or producing hateful 
grudges, psychologically contrary to their original 
purpose. They mean heteronomy – a dependence on 
precepts that are not justified by the rationality of 
the individual. (Adorno, 1969/1995, p. 109)
Nevertheless, these bonds, historically constituted 
based on the legality between patriarchs, kings and 
warriors, have elements that confer authority based on 
norms, which impose obedience of other individuals, 
acquired by different forms of authority that represent 
the structure of domination.
Therefore, the subjective aspect also defines these 
relations of power or autonomy. In contrast, what is central 
to Weber in the subjective constitution of domination is 
the legitimizing nature of a given situation (by virtue 
of rationally provided conditions (Adorno, 1969/1995). 
Meanwhile, the subjectivism that can be deduced from 
Weber, according to Adorno, however nominalist, allows 
the understanding of something constitutive above the 
merely operational. In contrast, in the crystallization of 
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the object due to excess of definitions and determinations, 
it accumulates operative concepts, making it possible to 
think of the contradiction of its methodology as being 
ideological (Adorno 1969/1995).
When it comes to discussing operative rationality 
from a human and cultural point of view, we return to 
Freud, since he connects his studies on group psychology 
and the constitution of institutions with the material 
manifestation of rationality, which involves needs and 
conditions of survival in society. Freud highlights the 
church and the army as institutional phenomena of mass 
psychology; the absence of freedom of the collective 
individual in observing the ambivalence between the 
affective attachment that he establishes with the leader: 
“changes and limitations of his personality” (Freud, 
1920/2011, p. 49).
In Freud’s studies (1920/2011), the nature of the 
bonds that unite the leader and the group, as well as the 
members of the group, are very clear. These relations 
underline the construction of certain forms of power and 
authority in which fantasy and idealization are common 
and indispensable to the construction of the social as a 
unit for the cultural universe. In this process, individuals 
remain in the group or institution by recognition, 
identification and belonging. In order to carry out a jointly 
agreed project, the fundamental differences in group 
policy cannot be questioned so that identification is to 
not be ruptured like cohesion – a fundamental element 
for maintaining control and, consequently, domination.
In this respect, it is noteworthy the meaning 
of political identification present in the collective as a 
sense of belonging. The subjective universe conceives 
ideology as shared by mechanisms of control, materialized 
by institutions, making it difficult for true collective 
identity to constitute itself dialectically (by affirmation 
and negation) in the relation between the elements of the 
universal – social and the particular – and individual 
(Adorno & Horkheimer, 1944/1985).
In addressing institutions as a cultural manifestation 
of the masses, the church and the army, for Freud (1920, 
2011), demonstrate that the demand for equality apparently 
does not include the leader. “Individuals must all be equal 
between each other, but everyone wants to be dominated 
by one alone. Many equal individuals able to identify 
with each other, and a single one, superior to all of them 
– this is the situation that occurs in a mass capable of 
subsisting” (Freud, 1920/2011, p. 83).
On the other hand, this condition of adherence to 
the masses by identification is related to the formulation of 
obedience and political domination in Weber (1920/1995). 
Given that it mentions prior subjective aspects of the 
domination triad: traditionalist, legalistic and charismatic. 
While the former consists of power exercised over the 
others in the name of tradition, the second occurs in 
function of the legality that gives legitimacy to power 
grounded on rules defined and recognized by regulations 
legally produced by authorities, and the third is conferred 
by the charisma of leaders themselves, demonstrating 
admirable qualities conditioned to achievements that 
imply their own merits.
In the meantime, Weber (1920/1995, p. 59) points 
out that “organized domination requires, on the one hand, 
a larger administrative state and, on the other, material 
means for management”: will, motivation or cohesion. In 
his analysis of the Modern State, he considered:
The development of the Modern State has as its 
starting point the desire of the prince to expropriate 
the independent private powers which, along with 
his own, have administrative power, that is, all 
owners of managerial means, financial resources, 
military instruments and of any species of property 
that may be used for political purposes. The Modern 
State was thus able to “deprive” administrative 
management as well as bureaucratic officials and 
workers of any means of management. (Weber, 
1920/1995, p. 62)
From these statements is derived the idea that 
the materialization of bureaucratic laws is defined in 
the objective universe according to subjective potential, 
given the historical conditions that mediate the needs 
and actions governed by social and cultural factors of 
domination and survival, permeated by a rationality 
administrated as to maintain power and the status quo.
Instrumental rationality, domination and 
resistance 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1988), in the chapter 
“The concept of enlightenment” from The dialectic of 
enlightenment, establish connections between the history 
of civilization, the process of technical development, 
culture and the consolidation of a contradictory rationality 
in the constitution of social institutions. Historically, 
ideological mechanisms have led to sources that legitimize 
political power and, consequently, labor as a sine qua non 
of rationalization and accumulation of wealth; held in the 
hands of a certain dominant power of the administrated 
society, under the logic of the capital, determining 
the formalization of reason allied with administered 
organization, defining a new historical and specific 
type of social division of labor and its constitution in 
modernity.
The division of labor, culminating in the social 
process of domination, serves the self-preservation 
of the whole that is dominated. In this way, with the 
whole as a whole, the activation of reason immanent 
to it necessarily converts itself into the execution of 
the particular. Domination confronts the individual 
as universal, as reason in actual reality. The power 
of all members of society, which as such have no 
other way out, always ends in the division of labor 
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imposed upon them. (Adorno & Horkheimer, 
1944/1988, pp. 30-31)
Thus, in the sense of the social division of labor, 
an immediatist idea of the whole, that is, immediately 
assimilated, reverses the understanding of the ideological 
process of the constitution of labor as an instrument that 
justifies solidary pseudocollectivity (false conscious 
organization, emancipated), and risks reifying the forms 
of thought.
Having concealed this form of collective 
domination, alienated labor legitimates itself under the 
productivist logic of capitalist society, which corroborates 
a metabolic relationship between man and nature, from 
which comes the production and reproduction of life 
(Marx, 1988/1995). This situation leads to the organic 
relationship between capitalism, institutions, labor, 
political enterprise, necessity and power in Weber 
(1920/1995). For this author, this association is ordered 
with the central objective of “taking advantage of political 
domination” (Weber, 1920/1995, p. 99).
As an interaction process between man and 
nature, there is an intervention caused by human action 
transforming capitalist society while at the same time 
maintaining it. This process is distinguished by the mode 
of production whose men are not only members of a 
community in which they are produced and reproduced 
by labor, but rather these relations are sustained by 
the accumulation of capital and its effects are directed 
towards immediate profit, where logico-formal reasoning 
“has become fully utilized in the social process. Its 
operational value, its role in the domination of men 
and nature became the sole criterion for evaluating it” 
(Horkheimer, 1946/2002, p. 26). In the ambivalence 
between the objective and subjective worlds, reason, as 
a manifestation of social development, materializes itself 
in the administration of domination. The emergence 
of high-scale productivity modifies the relations of 
production as well as social relations, aiming to establish 
the primacy of immediacy. The subject is imprisoned by 
determined social objectivity and managed by the logic 
of consumption and the ideological mechanisms of the 
cultural industry.
The cultural industry is a concept elaborated in 
1947 by Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1988). It presents a 
subservient communication network with economic groups 
that invest in culture in order to maintain and restructure 
the capitalist system by encouraging consumption in 
an expanded way, particularly after the Second World 
War. It engenders a false human formation in all its 
tessituras and accomplishes what Adorno (1951/2008) 
calls “Realization of the spirit conquered by the fetish 
character of the merchandise” (p. 11). Demands that 
affect social relations and the ways of producing life are 
therefore decisive, and critical reflections are sacrificed. 
“The objectivity of people with each other, abolishing the 
ideological ornament in their relationship, has become 
ideology itself in order to treat people as things” (Adorno, 
1951/2008, p. 38). Cultural administration presupposes, 
in advance, rational ideological knowledge. According to 
Adorno and Horkheimer (1944/1988), the cultural industry 
performs Kantian schematism (a priori rationalism) in 
an administered manner.
Processes of rationalization are justified by the 
ends of transforming the world based on alienated conduct 
itself, that is, the asceticism of professional work and 
its functionality, manifest representations enclosed in 
their cultural, political and institutional patterns. The 
final objective would be domination by “awareness of 
influencing other human beings, feeling of participating 
in power” (Weber, 1920/1995, 105).
Final considerations
As seen in this article, the intentional purposes of 
administrative rationality embrace factors of domination 
in collective and individual terms. This is revealed 
in the history of civilization. Due to the growth of 
individualism by the advance of liberalism, the decline 
of the collective myth confers, according to Adorno 
(1969/1995), “excessive importance to individual persons 
and private relations against the effectively determinant, 
from the social point of view, as evident compensation of 
the functionalization of reality” (p. 80). However, if the 
reflection of working conditions also contributed to this 
growth, as well as the tensions between individuation and 
individualization, differentiation and identity, fruit of the 
relations of production of alienated labor developed in 
capitalist society, it can be said that instrumental reasoning 
has caused the inversion between the particular and the 
universal. But when considering dialectical contradiction, 
it is not definite.
In all of this macro and microsocial process, 
in which the instrumentalization of reason exercised 
its domain, social conformation has stood out by 
means of hegemonic thinking, concealed by ideology. 
Sociological analysis of politically administrated 
rationality, governed by the liberal system, crystallizes 
as determined, magical-animistic, even though it is 
historical, yet contradictory thinking. Reason and 
power come together “naturally” in the broad of 
human omnipotence which, in Freud’s view (1914/2010), 
maintains man as a “psychological image”. Currently, 
domination and alienation persevere.
In Weber (1920/1995) this is posed by questioning 
the purposes that lead man to politics as a factor of the 
ethical sphere. Otherwise, to Freud (1914/2012), power 
imposes the condition of being social captive of one’s 
own needs and, most ironically, these needs are not 
always conscious. Therefore, before being tested as an 
ethical element, reason is the result of primary (basic) 
identifications that may or may not lead to a condition of 
social acceptance, depending on how the subject deals 
with social obstacles and the possibilities of immediate 
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satisfaction, that is, the way it elaborates factors of 
culture mediated by subjective factors. Domination and 
emancipation coexist side by side, denying and affirming 
themselves dialectically.
According to the conception of the authors studied, 
because they treat labor as a fruit of rationality, taboos 
and beliefs can not be ignored because they exercise their 
“magical power”, since mechanisms of social domination 
are determinant in order to justify the naturalization of 
“myth” (reason and fantasy) under the perspective of 
class and collective consciousness. Reflection on this 
process underlies the relentless “hand” of the sphere 
of production demands and the procedure of social 
rationality. Ideologically, social forces have given rise 
to such a perspective that contradictorily causes reason 
to abdicate, in a calculated manner, its autonomy and 
become an applicable subjectivist instrument.
The consequences of this process, when 
misunderstanding the order of their ideas according to 
the order of socially organized nature and uncritical 
rationality, are reflected by what men seemed to exercise 
in control over things, being infected by the “Principle 
of magic, animistic way of thinking, the omnipotence 
of thoughts”(Freud, 1914/2012, p. 116, emphasis added).
On the other hand, it can be understood that, for 
Weber (1999/2004), the reflections of different rationalities 
allow for the conception of subjectivity and objectivity 
based on social action as being an object of study. For 
the author, social action is oriented towards “the other” 
with sense and meanings that express relation between 
means and ends, and are based on rational criteria. In 
the process of expansion and development of modern 
capitalism, social action is understood as everything 
that is productive and thus desirable, as long as it meets 
the prerequisites of the industrial process. All scientific 
production, even if contrary to humanistic principles, 
has become highly technologically stimulated, even if 
devoid of reflexive interest.
Such rationality implies political adjustments in 
order to safeguard the consequences, in the same way 
the magical power of domination, when involved by 
charisma and legality, attends directives of formalized 
reason. The indigence of the realm of subjectivity is not 
only legitimized by a formal, logical, social, and political 
rationality, but is violent: “The decisive instrument of 
politics is violence” (Weber, 1920/1995, p. 114). This 
ideologically legitimizes both individual and collective 
domination permeated by different ethical conceptions 
(p. 115).
It is a rationality in which the means justify 
the ends in the name of a morality whose logic is 
determined by interests of power and domination. 
Weber teaches that when morality is an instrument 
of power, there is no ethics devoid of ideology. To 
Adorno (1969/1995a), what is essential to Weber 
in the subjective constitution of domination is its 
legitimizing character in a given situation. This 
reveals the ideological veil of reason. In other words, 
it indicates the utilitarian meaning of any form of 
rationality institutionalized by actions that legitimize 
themselves from social and individual norms, aiming 
for a “given policy by vocation that involves reified 
identities and risks situations which, in contrast to 
autonomy, authoritarian perspectives prevail.
With regard to the questioning of subjective limits 
from predominant reasoning that is culturally legitimized 
by objective mechanisms, it is advisable for the delusional 
portion that in Freud’s view (1929/1973) when grounding 
oneself on apparent reality, there are risks hiding elements 
that are beyond critical analysis, like recognizing fantasy 
components referring to rationality itself, strengthening 
taboos idealized by narcissistic and prepotent subjects 
who would not oppose resistance to ideology and weaken 
the capacity for elaboration and self-criticism.
This reinforces what Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1944/1988) caution: administered rationality grounds 
a solid, socially necessary division of human functions, 
independent from each other so that none of them can 
be transformed into anything other than the framework 
of the human being. However, as Adorno (1994) would 
say, however intolerable this is, it is only a fetish, and 
as such, when the individual does not succumb, it may 
be broken by the awareness of the very contradiction of 
irrational rationality.
Racionalidade institucional e dominação à luz de Weber, Freud e Adorno: adesão acrítica ou emancipatória
Resumo: Com base na teoria crítica da sociedade do filósofo Theodor Adorno, este trabalho propõe refletir sobre elementos 
objetivos do âmbito da estrutura institucional e social que fundam ideias referentes à racionalidade e à dominação, considerando 
fatores subjetivos correlatos às ideias do sociólogo Max Weber. Nesse sentido, corrobora-se ideias acerca da formação complexa 
da identidade do sujeito diante das exigências de conservação humana, apresentadas à luz da psicanálise de Sigmund 
Freud; uma discussão controversa, porém fundamental para a teoria crítica, posto que considera contribuições da psicologia 
perpassadas por elementos que se ampliam para além de comportamentos determinados, conscientes ou alienados. Ou seja, 
almeja fatores culturais, históricos e sociológicos como bases primordiais para a análise da ideologia como fator racional o qual 
transcorre o período moderno.
Palavras-chave: formação, identidade, violência, autoridade, política.
343
343
2018   I   volume 29   I   número 3   I   336-344
Institutional rationality and domination in the light of Weber, Freud and Adorno
Adorno, T. W. (1960). De la relacion entre sociologia y 
psicologia. In W. T. Adorno, Actualidad de la Filosofia 
(pp. 135-204). Buenos Aires, Argentina: Paidós. (Trabalho 
original publicado em 1955)
Adorno, T. W. (1984). Dialectica negativa (J. M. Ripalda, 
trad.). Buenos Aires: Taurus (Trabalho original publicado 
em 1975)
Adorno, T., W. (1994). Sociologia (G. C., trad.). São Paulo, 
SP: Ática.
Adorno, T. W. (1995). Educação e emancipação (W. L. 
Maar, trad.). Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Paz e Terra. (Trabalho 
original publicado em 1971)
Adorno, T. W. (1995). Palavras e sinais: modelos críticos 2 
(M. H. Ruschel, trad.). Petrópolis, RJ: Vozes. (Trabalho 
original publicado em 1969)
Adorno, T. W. (2008). Mínima morália (G. C., trad.). Rio 
de Janeiro, RJ: Azougue Editorial. (Trabalho original 
publicado em 1951)
Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1977). Temas básicos 
da sociologia (A. Cabral, trad.). São Paulo, SP: Cultrix. 
(Trabalho original publicado em 1956)
Adorno, T. W., & Horkheimer, M. (1988). Dialética do 
esclarecimento: fragmentos filosóficos (G. A. A., trad.). 
Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Zahar. (Trabalho original publicado 
em 1944)
Freud, S. (1973). El malestar em la cultura. In Obras 
Completas (L. L. Ballesteros, trad., Vol. 3, pp. 3.017-
3.068). Madri, España: Nueva Biblioteca. (Trabalho 
original publicado em 1929)
Freud S. (2010). História de uma neurose infantil “O 
homem dos lobos”, Além do princípio do prazer e 
outros textos (P. C. Souza, trad., Vol. 1). São Paulo, SP: 
Companhia das Letras. (Trabalho original publicado 
em 1917)
Freud, S. (2010). Introdução ao narcisismo (P. C. S., 
trad., Vol. 12). São Paulo, SP: Companhia das Letras. 
(Trabalho original publicado em 1914)
Freud, S. (2011). Psicologia das massas e análise do 
eu e outros textos (P. C. Souza, trad). São Paulo, SP: 
Companhia das Letras. (Trabalho original publicado em 
1920)
Freud, S. (2012). Totem e tabu (P. C. Souza, trad., Vol. 11). 
São Paulo, SP: Companhia das Letras. (Trabalho original 
publicado em 1914)
Horkheimer, M. (2002). Eclipse da razão (E. Centauro, 
trad.). São Paulo, SP: Centauro. (Trabalho original 
publicado em 1946)
Jaspers, K. (1977). Sociologia: para ler os clássicos (C., 
Gabriel, trad.). Rio de Janeiro, RJ: Livros Técnicos e 
Científicos.
Rationalité institutionnelle et domination à la lumière de Weber, Freud et Adorno: adhésion non critique ou 
émancipatrice
Résumé : Basée sur la théorie critique de la société du philosophe Theodor Adorno, cet article propose de réfléchir sur des 
éléments objectifs du contexte de la structure institutionnelle et sociale qui fondent les idées sur la rationalité et la domination, 
en considérant des facteurs subjectifs liés aux idées du sociologue Max Weber. En ce sens, les idées sur la formation complexe 
de l’identité du sujet contre les exigences de la conservation humaine, présentées à la lumière de la psychanalyse de Sigmund 
Freud, sont corroborées; une discussion controversée, cependant, critique à la théorie critique, car elle considère que les 
contributions des chargés de la psychologie avec des éléments qui vont au-delà de certains comportements, conscients ou 
aliénées ou facteurs culturels implorent, historiques et sociologiques, comme bases primaires pour l’analyse de l’idéologie en 
tant que facteur rationnel qui traverse la période moderne.
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Racionalidad institucional y dominación a la luz de Weber, Freud y Adorno: adhesión acrítica o emancipatoria
Resumen: Con base en la teoría crítica del filósofo Theodor Adorno, este documento propone reflexionar sobre el contexto de los 
elementos objetivos de la estructura institucional y social de fundación ideas relacionadas con la racionalidad y la dominación, 
teniendo en cuenta los factores subjetivos vinculados a las ideas del sociólogo Max Weber. En ese sentido, apoya las ideas acerca 
de la compleja formación de la identidad del sujeto frente a las exigencias de la conservación humana presentado a la luz del 
psicoanálisis de Sigmund Freud; una discusión controversial, sin embargo fundamental para la teoría crítica, ya que considera 
las contribuciones de la psicología cargadas con elementos que se extienden más allá de ciertos comportamientos, conscientes 
o alienados, o anhelan factores culturales, históricos y sociológicos como bases principales para el análisis de la ideología como 
factor racional, lo que transcurre la época moderna.
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